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CONFUSING CLARITY: THE PREGNANCY 
DISCRIMINATION ACT AFTER YOUNG V. UPS, INC. 
Jessica M. Bretl* 
“Our task is to clarify the law—not to muddy the waters . . . .” 
—Justice Antonin Scalia1 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 25, 2015, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Young v. 
UPS, Inc.2—the most recent case in the Court’s pregnancy discrimination 
jurisprudence.  Young focused on an interpretation of one clause of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) and how that interpretation would 
shape claims of employment discrimination by pregnant employees seeking 
work accommodations.  This Comment argues that the majority opinion in 
Young did not clarify, but only muddied the waters: the Young framework 
presents challenges for the lower courts tasked with applying the 
framework and creates uncertainty for future pregnancy discrimination 
litigation. 
Part I of this Comment provides background on the PDA and 
describes the Court’s approach to pregnancy discrimination prior to Young.  
Part II summarizes the facts and procedural history of the case, and Part III 
explains the majority opinion by Justice Breyer.  Part IV analyzes three 
main weaknesses in the majority’s argument: (i) the uncertainty and 
problems resulting from the Court’s new framework, (ii) the uncertainty 
surrounding how to handle Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) guidelines, and (iii) the confusion that will result from the Court’s 
failure to address new statutory changes.  Part IV then concedes the major 
strengths of the Court’s argument: (i) consistency with respect to “most-
favored-nation” status for employee accommodations, and (ii) the Court’s 
clear application of rules of statutory interpretation. 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2016. 
 1  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 574 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 2  135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
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I.     BACKGROUND: GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. V. GILBERT AND THE PDA 
In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act,3 and in Title VII 
addressed employment discrimination.  Section 703(a)(1) states that it is 
unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”4  Thus, Title VII did not expressly mention pregnancy, 
and there was extensive controversy in the 1970s over whether sex 
discrimination included pregnancy discrimination.5 
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,6 the Supreme Court held that 
discrimination based on pregnancy does not necessarily constitute unlawful 
sex discrimination and is not sex discrimination on its face.7  At issue in 
Gilbert was General Electric’s disability plan for its employees, which paid 
weekly non-occupational sickness and accident benefits, but excluded 
disabilities arising from pregnancy.8  A class of female employees from a 
General Electric plant in Virginia argued that the exclusion of pregnancy 
from the disability plan constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9  Each employee presented a claim for 
disability benefits under the plan to cover the employee’s absence from 
work due to pregnancy.10  These claims were denied on the ground that the 
plan did not provide disability-benefit payments for any absence due to 
pregnancy.11  The women filed complaints with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission and then filed suit.12 
In Gilbert, the Court overturned the district court and the Fourth 
Circuit, who had both reasoned that Title VII required equal opportunities 
for men and women and that the cost-differential resulting from adding 
pregnancy to the disabilities plan was not a defense to sex discrimination.13  
The Gilbert Court also said that pregnancy discrimination was not per se 
discrimination based on sex.14  While acknowledging that pregnancy was, 
of course, applicable only to women, the Court stated that pregnancy was 
 
 3  Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).  
 4  Id. § 703(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)) (emphasis added).  
 5  P. DANIEL WILLIAMS, THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT: A GUIDE FOR 
PLAINTIFF EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS 3 (2011).  
 6  429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 7  Id. at 127–28.  
 8  Id. at 127. 
 9  Id. at 127–28. 
 10  Id. at 128–29.  
 11  Id. at 129. 
 12  Id.   
 13  Id. at 130–32.  
 14  Id. at 136.  
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still significantly different than the diseases the plan typically covered.15  
The Court even emphasized the district court’s finding that pregnancy “is 
not a ‘disease’ at all” but “a voluntarily undertaken and desired 
condition.”16  Therefore, the Court found that there was no reason to 
conclude the exclusion of pregnancy was simply a pretext for sex-based 
discrimination.17  The majority opinion further concluded that the concept 
of “discrimination” was recognized at the time Title VII was enacted as 
being associated with the Fourteenth Amendment, so when Congress made 
it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate . . . because of . . . sex . . . ,” 
the Court would “not readily infer that it meant something different from 
what the concept of discrimination has traditionally meant.”18 
Then in 1978, Congress, spurred on by the controversy surrounding 
Gilbert,19 amended Title VII with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.20  The 
PDA added new language to the definitions section of Title VII.21  The first 
clause of the PDA states that Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination applies to discrimination “because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”22  The second clause 
says that employers must treat “women affected by pregnancy . . . the same 
for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected 
but similar in their ability or inability to work.”23  In Young v. UPS, Inc.,24 
the Court addressed the issue of how to interpret this second clause of the 
PDA.  The issue was whether the second clause of the PDA applies when 
an employer’s policy “accommodates many, but not all, workers with 
nonpregnancy-related disabilities.”25 
 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. (quoting Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 377 (E.D. Va. 1974), 
aff’d, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 421 U.S. 125 (1976)).  
 17  Id.  
 18  Id. at 145 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); then citing Ozawa v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922)).  
 19  WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at v. 
 20  Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012)). 
 21  The definitions section of Title VII now states, in relevant part: 
  The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited 
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, 
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so 
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 
2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 22  Id.   
 23  Id.  
 24  135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).  
 25  Id. at 1344.  
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II.     YOUNG V. UPS, INC.:  
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The plaintiff, Peggy Young, was a part-time driver for defendant 
United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS).26  Her job was to pick up and deliver 
packages.27  In 2006, Young became pregnant, and her doctor advised her 
that she should not lift certain weights: anything over twenty pounds during 
the first twenty weeks of pregnancy and anything over ten pounds 
thereafter.28  UPS, however, required drivers to be able to lift packages 
weighing up to seventy pounds.29  When informed of Young’s restriction, 
UPS told Young that she could not work while under the lifting 
restriction.30  Young was therefore forced to stay home without pay during 
her pregnancy, eventually losing her employee medical coverage.31 
Young alleged that UPS accommodated other drivers “similar in 
their . . . inability to work.”32  UPS responded that the other accommodated 
drivers were “(1) drivers who had become disabled on the job, (2) those 
who had lost their Department of Transportation (DOT) certifications, and 
(3) those who suffered from a disability covered by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990.”33  UPS claimed that Young was not 
accommodated during her lifting restriction because she did not fall within 
those categories, and it treated her just like it would all other relevant 
persons.34 
In 2007, Young filed a pregnancy discrimination charge with the 
EEOC.35  The EEOC provided her with a right-to-sue letter, and she 
subsequently brought a federal lawsuit.36  Young alleged “that she could 
show by direct evidence that UPS had intended to discriminate against her 
because of her pregnancy” and also could establish a case of disparate 
treatment.37  For her intentional discrimination claim, Young pointed to a 
statement made by a UPS manager saying while she was pregnant she was 
“too much of a liability” and could “not come back” until she “was no 
 
 26  Id. 
 27  Id.  
 28  Id.  
 29  Id.  
 30  Id.  
 31  Id.  
 32  Id. (quoting Petitioner’s Brief at 31, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (No. 12-1226), 
2014 WL 4441528, at *31).  
 33  Id.  These categories were referred to in general as the facially neutral category of 
“off-the-job injuries.”  See id. at 1349.  
 34  Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 34, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (No. 12-
1226), 2014 WL 5464086, at *34).  
 35  Id. at 1346.  
 36  Id.  
 37  Id. 
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longer pregnant.”38  For her disparate treatment claim, Young pointed to 
the fact that UPS had a light-duty-for-injury policy with respect to several 
other persons (including the three categories described above) but not for 
pregnant workers.39 
After discovery, UPS filed a motion for summary judgment.40  The 
district court granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment,41 citing mainly 
that the people Young had compared herself to were too different to qualify 
as “similarly situated comparator[s].”42  The Fourth Circuit affirmed, 
writing that UPS’s policy was “pregnancy-blind,” that the policy was “at 
least facially a ‘neutral and legitimate business practice,’ and was not 
motivated by animus toward pregnant women.43  Interestingly, the Fourth 
Circuit noted that Young was more like an employee who had injured his 
back while lifting up his young child, or injured himself during off-the-job 
work as a volunteer firefighter, neither of whom would have been eligible 
for accommodations for lift restrictions at UPS.44 
III.     THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND CLAUSE 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion focused almost entirely on how to 
interpret the second clause of the PDA, which provides that women 
affected by pregnancy shall be treated the same for employment purposes 
“as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to 
work.”45  The policy at issue in Young distinguished between pregnant and 
nonpregnant employees based on characteristics not related to pregnancy, 
specifically in this case, categorizing accommodated employees in a 
facially neutral category of “off-the-job injuries.”46 
Each side presented very different theories on how to interpret the 
second clause of the PDA.  Young argued that the second clause of the 
PDA means that when an employer “accommodates only a subset of 
workers with disabling conditions,” a court should find them in violation of 
Title VII if “‘pregnant workers who are similar in the ability to work’ do 
 
 38  Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 20, Young v. UPS, Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321 (D. 
Md. Feb. 14, 2011) (No. DKC 08 CV 2586), 2010 WL 10839226). 
 39  Id. at 1347 (citing Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 38, at 29).  
 40  Id. at 1346.  
 41  Id. at 1347.  
 42  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *14). 
 43  Id. at 1347–48 (quoting Young v. UPS, Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 446 (4th Cir. 2013)).  
This argument sounds very similar to the argument Justice Alito espoused in his test, which 
would simply require employers to assert a neutral business reason for treating employees 
differently.  Id. at 1359 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 44  Id. at 1348 (majority opinion) (quoting Young, 707 F. 3d at 448).  
 45  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).  
 46  Id. at 1349.  
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not ‘receive the same [accommodation] even if still other non-pregnant 
workers do not receive accommodations.’”47  UPS argued that the second 
clause of the PDA does not add an additional requirement of employers 
other than to simply define sex discrimination to include pregnancy 
discrimination.48  Under this interpretation, courts simply have to compare 
the accommodations provided to pregnant employees with the 
accommodations provided to others within a facially neutral category, like 
“off-the-job injuries.”49 
The Court found both Young’s and UPS’s arguments unpersuasive.  
The Court first argued that Young’s approach was too broad and literal.50  
Young’s interpretation turned solely on evidence that pregnant and 
nonpregnant workers were not treated the same, and the Court said such an 
interpretation could not stand.51  The Court’s main problem with Young’s 
argument was that it reads the statute to grant to all pregnant employees a 
most-favored-nation status.52  This means that if an employer provided any 
worker with an accommodation—including, for example, employees with 
particularly hazardous jobs—then the employer would have to give 
accommodations to all pregnant workers.53  Furthermore, the Court 
 
 47  Id. at 1349 (alteration in original) (quoting Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 32, at 28).  
 48  Id. (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 34, at 25).  
 49  Id.  
 50  Id. 
 51  Id.  Earlier in the Court’s opinion, the Court laid out the framework for how to 
prove a disparate treatment claim.  The Court said that a plaintiff could prove disparate 
treatment by showing “either (1) by direct evidence that a workplace policy, practice, or 
decision relies expressly on a protected characteristic, or (2) by using the burden-shifting 
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas.”  Id. at 1345.  In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court said the plaintiff must carry the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: 
(i) that he belongs to a . . . minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job 
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant’s qualifications. 
Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).  The Court in 
McDonnell Douglas also stated that if a plaintiff makes the requisite showing, then the 
employer must have an opportunity “to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for” treating employees outside the protected class better than employees within the 
protected class.  Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).  If the employer is able 
to articulate such a reason, the plaintiff then has the “opportunity to prove by preponderance 
of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant [i.e., the employer] were 
not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.”  Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).  Therefore, the 
McDonnell Douglas framework governs disparate treatment claims.  
 52  Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349; see also infra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
 53  Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349–50. 
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doubted that Congress intended to grant such an unconditional preferred 
status to pregnant workers, because the second clause uses the open-ended 
term “other persons” and does not specify that employers treat pregnant 
women the “same” as “any other persons.”54 
The Court also rejected UPS’s interpretation of the second clause.  
UPS simply read the second clause to define sex discrimination to include 
pregnancy discrimination.55  The Court found that conclusion incorrect, as 
the first clause of the PDA already expressly amends Title VII’s 
definitional provision to clarify that pregnancy discrimination counts as sex 
discrimination.56  The Court used two arguments to debunk UPS’s theory.  
First, the Court reasoned that “‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so 
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause’ is rendered ‘superfluous, 
void, or insignificant.’”57  However, under UPS’s interpretation, the second 
clause simply reiterates exactly what the first clause said, in contravention 
of this common canon of statutory interpretation.  Second, the Court argued 
that UPS’s interpretation would also fail to carry out an important 
congressional objective: overturning Gilbert.58  In California Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the Court reasoned that the first clause of 
the PDA reflected congressional disapproval of the Court’s reasoning in 
Gilbert, and the second clause was intended to overrule it by “illustrat[ing] 
how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied.”59  Guerra 
established that both clauses are needed to overrule Gilbert, and to read the 
second clause as merely a repetition of the first would ignore precedent and 
defeat the congressional objective of the PDA. 
After dismissing both Young’s and UPS’s interpretations of the 
second clause of the PDA, the Court set forth its own interpretation.  The 
Court laid out a framework for how a pregnant worker can succeed on a 
disparate treatment theory through direct evidence.  The Court followed the 
McDonnell Douglas framework,60 which requires a plaintiff to make a 
prima facie case of discrimination by “‘showing actions taken by the 
employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, 
that it is more likely than not that such actions were based on a 
discriminatory criterion illegal under’ Title VII.”61  The Court noted that 
this showing is not onerous or burdensome, and does not require a showing 
 
 54  Id. at 1350.  
 55  Id. at 1352 (citing Brief for Respondent, supra note 34, at 25).  
 56  Id.  
 57  Id. (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).  
 58  Id. at 1353.  For an explanation of the Court’s approach in Gilbert, see notes 6–18 
and accompanying text. 
 59  479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987).  
 60  See supra note 51. 
 61  Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 
576 (1978)).   
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that those whom the employer favored and disfavored were similar in all 
but the protected ways.62 
Thus, the Court suggested the following framework: First, a plaintiff 
must show she belongs to a protected class, then show she applied for an 
accommodation from her employer.63  Next, she must show that the 
employer did not accommodate her, but did accommodate others “similar 
in their ability or inability to work.”64  Then, the employer has the burden 
of showing its refusal of an accommodation was justified because the 
employer relied “on ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reasons” for denying 
the accommodation.65  If the employer succeeds, then the burden shifts 
back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reasons are, in fact, 
pretextual.66  This is the point in the framework at which the Court 
proposed a new standard.  The Court said that, regarding the employer’s 
stated reasons, a plaintiff could reach a jury by simply providing 
sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant 
burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the 
burden, but rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—
give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. 
The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a 
significant burden exists by providing evidence that the employer 
accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing 
to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers.67 
This last part of the Court’s framework, and the standards it sets forth, are 
what this Comment will focus on.  
 
 62  Id.  
 63  Id.  
 64  Id.   
 65  Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).  The 
Court also noted that the employer’s reason for rejection cannot be that it was simply more 
expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the class the employer 
accommodates.  Id.  The Court explained that, if such reasoning justified rejecting 
accommodations for pregnant women, then the employer in Gilbert could have succeeded.  
Id.  
 66  Id.  
 67  Id. 
2015] C O N F U S I N G  C L A R I T Y  19 
IV.     ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S OPINION IN YOUNG 
A.   Weaknesses 
1.   An Uncertain Framework 
The framework set out by the Court directly above initially reads 
fairly clearly.  However, when the Court applies this framework, the 
seeming clarity obscures into a vague and potentially subjective 
application.  First, the Court initially states that Young could use the 
evidence that UPS had multiple policies for accommodating certain 
nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions as evidence that UPS’s 
reason not to similarly accommodate pregnant workers are “not sufficiently 
strong.” 68  This reasoning is consistent with the Court’s framework.  
However, the Court goes on to state that it will not consider whether UPS’s 
reasons were sufficiently strong, but remands to the Fourth Circuit to make 
that determination.69  This seems to contradict the Court’s earlier statement 
that the three accommodations policies would show that UPS’s reasons 
were “not sufficiently strong.”70  The Court’s lack of clarity regarding what 
would qualify as “sufficiently strong” might cause problems for the lower 
court in determining what constitutes a sufficiently strong justification for 
the burden. 
Second, the Court stated, “[t]he plaintiff can create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing 
evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of 
nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of 
pregnant workers.”71  However, the Court did not cite this language again 
when it applied its new framework to Young’s case.  The Court simply said 
that it would leave the lower court to determine if UPS’s reasons were 
pretextual.  This leaves open the question of whether the lower court should 
simply make a judgment call as to what constitutes “a large percentage” to 
create a burden.  Does large percentage mean 51% or 75%?  What is 
sufficiently large for the plaintiff to establish an issue of material fact?  
Such an ambiguous standard could lead to subjective calls by lower courts 
when deciding whether the percentage is large enough to tip the scales in 
the plaintiff’s direction.  The Court does not provide enough guidance to 
lead the lower courts to determine what the Court means when it says 
“large percentage.”  
An additional problem with the Court’s test is that it seems to come 
out of thin air: there is no clear basis for these new standards that the Court 
 
 68  Id.  
 69  Id. at 1356. 
 70  Id. at 1354. 
 71  Id. (emphasis added). 
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creates.  Justice Rehnquist once famously analyzed another standard 
apparently self-created by the Court by saying: “The Court’s conclusion . . . 
apparently comes out of thin air. . . . [T]he phrases used are so diaphanous 
and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices . . . .”72  
Subjective application of the new phrases the Court proposes in Young 
could lead to confusion, not clarity, when lower courts interpret future 
pregnancy discrimination cases under the PDA. 
2.   What To Do with the EEOC Guidelines 
Young began her claim in July 2007 by filing a pregnancy 
discrimination charge with the EEOC, and in September 2008 they 
provided her with a right-to-sue letter.73  Young’s actions were consistent 
with her obligation, under Title VII, to exhaust administrative routes before 
filing suit against her employer.74  Under Title VII, claimants must file with 
the EEOC within 180 days from the act of discrimination.75  The EEOC is 
then responsible for investigating the alleged act of discrimination.76  Then, 
the claimant must wait for at least six months before receiving a ninety-day 
notice of a right to sue, and then must file suit within ninety days.77  The 
EEOC also issues general guidelines, which the Court in Young declined to 
follow.78 
The EEOC issued guidance before Congress passed the PDA, stating 
that, “‘[d]isabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy . . . are, for all 
job-related purposes, temporary disabilities’ and . . . ‘benefits and 
privileges . . . shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy . . . on the 
same . . . conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.’”79  
After the PDA was passed, the EEOC issued guidance consistent with 
earlier statements saying, “[i]f other employees temporarily unable to lift 
are relieved of these functions, pregnant employees also unable to lift must 
be temporarily relieved of the function.”80  Even recently, in July 2014, the 
EEOC put out another guideline clarifying any ambiguity in its position, 
saying, “[a]n employer may not refuse to treat a pregnant worker the same 
 
 72  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 220–21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 73  Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1346. 
 74  Under Title VII, an employer is defined as a person or entity engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce that has fifteen or more employees for each working day in 
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or proceeding calendar year.  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012).  For more information on the procedural requirements for filing a 
pregnancy discrimination claim, see WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 75  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).  
 76  Id. § 2000e-5(b). 
 77  Id. § 2000e–5(f)(1). 
 78  Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1352. 
 79  Id. at 1351 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975)).  
 80  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1604 (1979)).  
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as other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work by 
relying on a policy that makes distinctions based on the source of an 
employee’s limitations . . . .”81  All of these guidelines were noted by the 
majority opinion in Young.  However, the Court went on to reject the 
EEOC guidelines.82 
The Solicitor General pointed out that the Court has long held that 
“‘the rulings, interpretations and opinions’ of an agency charged with the 
mission of enforcing a particular statute, ‘while not controlling upon the 
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance.’”83  However, the Court ignored this precedent and disregarded 
the EEOC’s clear guidance on this issue.  The Court cited timing, 
consistency, and thoroughness of consideration as reasons to deny the 
EEOC guidelines.84  The majority claimed that the 2014 guideline had been 
put forth only after the Court had granted certiorari in Young.85  The Court 
seemed to take this timing issue as dispositive, and claimed that the 2014 
guideline takes a position on which the EEOC had previously been silent.86   
The EEOC guidelines seem perfectly clear: treating pregnant workers 
less favorably than other similar disabled workers is impermissible.  It is 
hard to see why the Court thought the most specific recent guideline was 
suspect, just because it was recent.  What better explains the Court’s 
dismissal of the EEOC guidelines is that the guidelines do not address the 
most-favored-nation status.87  The main focus of the majority opinion is to 
reject the most-favored-nation status and—without any prior guidance from 
the EEOC to the contrary—the Court was assuming the EEOC guidelines 
would support most-favored-nation status for pregnant employees.  
However, the Solicitor General’s point about precedent cautions the Court 
against dismissing the EEOC guidelines too quickly.  The agency charged 
with enforcing a statute should get to weigh in on how that statute is 
interpreted, and the content of the EEOC guidelines should be carefully 
considered by the Court—not quickly dismissed simply because of their 
release date. 
 
 81  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 626-I(A)(5), p. 626:0009 (July 2014)).  This 2014 guideline 
especially seems to favor Young’s claim. 
 82  Id. at 1351–52. 
 83  Id. at 1351 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (citing 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26, Young, 135 S. Ct. 
1338 (2015) (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 4536939, at *26).  
 84  Id. at 1352. 
 85  Id.  
 86  Id. 
 87  Id.  
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Another reason that the Court should not have rejected the EEOC 
guidelines in Young is that the PDA was widely accepted as overruling 
Gilbert, and Gilbert also ignored the EEOC guidelines.  In Gilbert, the 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on EEOC guidelines that stated (i) it 
was unlawful to discriminate between men and women with regard to 
fringe benefits, and (ii) pregnancy related conditions must be covered.88  In 
his dissent, Justice Brennan focused on the majority’s inattention to the 
1972 EEOC guidelines.89  He argued that it is prudent for Congress to leave 
complex economic and social matters of interpreting Title VII to the 
EEOC.90  He cited prior Title VII decisions that regarded EEOC guidelines 
as persuasive, and urged that the guidelines should be given great 
deference.91  Justice Brennan even noted that the EEOC guidelines were 
consistent with holdings made by “every other Western industrial 
country.”92 
Thus the majority in Young dismissed the EEOC guidelines too 
quickly and followed the same track as the majority in Gilbert.  As Justice 
Brennan pointed out in his Gilbert dissent, the Court should have given the 
EEOC guidelines more deference. 
3.   Uncertainty Looking Forward 
By its own admittance, the Court was concerned about uncertainty 
created by other legal authority, especially a statutory change that occurred 
after Young’s case first began: “In 2008, Congress expanded the definition 
of ‘disability’ under the ADA to make clear that ‘physical or mental 
impairment[s] that substantially limi[t]’ an individual’s ability to lift, stand, 
or bend are ADA-covered disabilities.”93  The Court mentioned that it was 
aware of this change, but stated it would express no view on this statutory 
change in this opinion.94  The Court seems to have simply punted this issue 
to decide later.  
However, the statutory change may be quite significant for future 
pregnancy discrimination jurisprudence; the expanded definition now 
 
 88  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140–41 (1976) (quoting 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.10(b) (1975)); id. at 141 n.19 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(b)).  
 89  Id. at 155–56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 90  Id. at 155. 
 91  Id. at 155–56 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 
400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring)).  
 92  Id. at 158 (citing OFFICE OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, 
1971, at ix, xviii, xix (1971)).  
 93  Young v. UPS, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1348 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(1)–(2) (2012)).  
 94  Id.  
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makes Young’s claim covered not only by the PDA, but also the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA).  Before, the ADA did not consider normal 
pregnancies disabilities.95  Therefore, only if there were something unusual 
about the pregnancy would a plaintiff be allowed to take advantage of the 
ADA.96  As a result of the expanded definition of “disability,” not only will 
abnormal pregnancy-related ailments be covered by the ADA, but so too 
will ailments related to normal pregnancy.  By choosing not to address the 
implications of the expanded ADA, the Court’s approach in Young could 
lead to more litigation, as plaintiffs attempt to apply the Court’s new 
standard in an ADA case. 
B.   Strengths 
1.   “Most-Favored-Nation” Status Consistency and Clarity 
A major strength of the majority opinion is its clear approach to the 
issue of “most-favored-nation” status for pregnant workers.  The majority 
opinion is consistent and clear in its holding that no possible reading of the 
second clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act will lead to a most-
favored-nation status for pregnant employees.  The majority, concurrence, 
and dissent all agreed on this point.  In his concurrence, Justice Alito stated 
that he “cannot accept this ‘most favored employee’ interpretation.”97  
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, gave an excellent description of what it would 
mean if the second clause were interpreted as granting a most-favored-
nation status to pregnant workers: 
If Boeing offered chauffeurs to injured directors, it would have to offer 
chauffeurs to pregnant mechanics.  And if Disney paid pensions to 
workers who can no longer work because of old age, it would have to 
pay pensions to workers who can no longer work because of childbirth.  
It is implausible that Title VII, which elsewhere creates guarantees of 
equal treatment, here alone creates a guarantee of favored treatment.98 
Justice Scalia concluded that the clause prohibits employers from 
distinguishing between pregnant women and others of similar ability or 
inability because of pregnancy, and that means that pregnant women are 
simply entitled to accommodations on the same terms as other workers.99  
He used UPS’s accommodation for drivers who have lost their 
certifications as an example and said that a pregnant woman who lost her 
certification gets the benefit, just like any other worker who lost their 
 
 95  See e.g., Tysinger v. Police Dep’t, 463 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that 
pregnancy alone is not a disability).  
 96  See WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 340. 
 97  Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1358 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 98  Id. at 1362 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 99  Id.  
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certification, which certainly looks like treating those who are pregnant the 
same.100  He therefore concluded that the clause prohibits treating a worker 
differently because of a protected trait, and does not prohibit employers 
from treating workers differently for reasons that have nothing to do with 
protected traits, just as UPS did here.101 
2.   Clarity in Statutory Interpretation 
Another strength of the majority opinion is its use of canons of 
statutory interpretation.  The majority reasons that the second clause of the 
PDA cannot simply be read to be restating its first clause.  The first clause 
expressly states that when Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of 
sex,” that statutory phrase includes pregnancy.  If the second clause were 
simply repeating that prohibition, the second clause would be superfluous.  
The Court has long held that “a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so 
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause . . . shall be superfluous, 
void, or insignificant.”102  Justice Scalia’s dissent argued that the second 
clause is not superfluous, but clarifying.103  The dissent seemed to think 
that the second clause simply makes “plain” that it would be unlawful to 
disfavor pregnant women relative to other workers of similar inability to 
work.104  However, as the majority pointed out, McDonnell Douglas 
already made clear that courts should consider how a plaintiff was treated 
relative to other persons of the same qualifications.105  In short, the 
dissent’s interpretation of the second clause is superfluous, given the 
Court’s approach in McDonnell Douglas.  Thus, in interpreting the second 
clause, the dissent is searching for clarification where none is needed.  The 
majority is more persuasive in arguing that lack of superfluous meaning is 
the better approach to interpreting the second clause.  This reading is 
clearer for future courts to apply and thus turns out to be more clarifying 
than the “clarifying” interpretation proffered by the dissent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s approach in Young creates uncertainty about the 
application of the PDA, which will obscure future pregnancy 
discrimination litigation in lower courts.  It is still unclear how the Fourth 
Circuit will evaluate standards like “sufficiently strong” justifications by 
 
 100  Id.  
 101  Id. at 1363.  
 102  TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 
U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).  
 103  Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1363 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 104  Id.  
 105  Id. at 1352 (majority opinion) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973)).  
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the state and accommodations for “a large percentage” of pregnant and 
nonpregnant workers.  These two new phrases might lead to subjective 
interpretations by lower courts, resulting in varying sets of rules among the 
circuits.  The Court was also too dismissive of the EEOC guidelines, and a 
more careful consideration of those guidelines would have helped the Court 
maintain consistency with precedent.  Finally, the Court’s opinion 
sidestepped the possible confusion that new statutory changes will have on 
future pregnancy discrimination cases.  In short, the new rule proposed by 
the Court in Young confuses, rather than clarifies.  With its remand to the 
Fourth Circuit, time will soon tell if lower courts will be confused by the 
Court’s new rule, or if it will clarify, rather than obscure, application of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act to this and future cases. 
